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INVESTORS BEWARE: HOW CALIFORNIA 
MUNICIPALITIES GET AWAY WITH 
DEFRAUDING INVESTORS AFTER NUVEEN 
MUNICIPAL HIGH INCOME OPPORTUNITY 
FUND V. CITY OF ALAMEDA 
Allan Gustin 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The first blue-sky laws were enacted in 1911 in the state of 
Kansas.
1
 Explanations vary as to how the laws earned their “blue-
sky” name.
2
 Some suggest that the purpose behind these statutes was 
to address such “speculative schemes which [had] no more basis than 
so many feet of blue sky.”
3
 Others suggest that the Kansas legislature 
created these laws in fear of “fast-talking eastern industrialists selling 
everything including the blue sky.”
4
 One way or another, the name 
stuck, and by 1933 at least forty-eight jurisdictions had enacted blue-
sky statutes.
5
 
In 1917, California enacted its first blue-sky laws, and except for 
minor modifications, these laws remained the basis of its securities 
regulation until 1968.
6
 In 1968, California consolidated its blue-sky 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Classical Studies, 
Brigham Young University, 2012. Special thanks to Professor Michael Guttentag for his time, 
attention, and legal advice. Thanks to Cameron Bell, Leah Johannesson, Lauren Gerenraich, 
Justin Potesta, and Jason Kirkorsky, who so faithfully and patiently combed through my 
Comment for what I know must have been frequent and frustrating mistakes. My sincerest 
gratitude goes to my wife, Sandy, who sacrificed so much to make my dream of studying the law 
possible. I also want to thank my parents for their countless sacrifices on my behalf and for 
teaching me the most important lessons of life.   
 1. LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 53 (4th ed. 2006). 
 2. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 8.1, at 
490–92 (3d ed. 1995). 
 3. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917). 
 4. HAZEN, supra note 2, at 491–92. 
 5. LOSS, supra note 1, at 58. 
 6. 9 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 401 (10th ed. 2012). 
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laws when it passed the California Corporate Securities Act of 1968.
7
 
Among the Corporate Securities Act’s provisions was a prohibition 
against misrepresentations made in the course of buying or selling 
securities.
8
 While the exact scope of the term “securities” is still 
debated, it is clear that municipal bonds fall within its meaning.
9
 
Municipal bonds are debt securities issued by states, cities, counties, 
and other government entities to finance capital projects including 
building schools, highways, and sewer systems.
10
 
To encourage investing in municipal bonds, municipalities give 
investors several benefits in return for their investment.
11
 Most 
municipal bond interest payments are exempt from federal income 
tax.
12
 These bonds may also be exempt from state and local taxes on 
residents in the state where the bond is issued.
13
 As a result of these 
tax benefits, interest on municipal bonds is usually lower than on 
taxable fixed-income securities.
14
 
While several types of municipal bonds are available for 
investment, the two most common types of municipal bonds are 
general obligation bonds and revenue bonds.
15
 Generally, debt 
service is a relatively small portion of most governments’ budgets.
16
 
However, a state’s reliance on deficit financing can lead to lower 
credit ratings, which is the case for states such as California, Illinois, 
and Arizona.
17
 
In September 2013, the Ninth Circuit explored the intersection 
between the California Corporate Securities Act of 1968 and the 
Government Tort Claims Act—that is, the act that grants 
municipalities sovereign immunity from lawsuits.
18
 Section 25400 of 
the Corporate Securities Act, together with section 25013, held 
municipalities liable for misrepresentations made in the sale of a 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400 (West 2014). 
 9. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West 2001). 
 10. Rabah Arezki et al., Municipal Fallout, 48 FIN. & DEV. 34, 35 (2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/arezki.htm. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 730 F.3d 1111 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
INVESTORS BEWARE 5/10/2015  8:15 PM 
Fall 2014] INVESTORS BEWARE 279 
security, but section 818.2 granted immunity to public entities for the 
misrepresentations of their employees.
19
 Nuveen Municipal High 
Income Opportunity Fund, Nuveen High Yield Municipal Bond 
Fund, and Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (collectively, 
“Nuveen”) sued the City of Alameda and Alameda Power and 
Telecom (APT) for alleged misrepresentations made in association 
with the sale of municipal bonds.
20
 The Court held that absent a clear 
indication of a legislative intent to remove municipal liability no 
cause of action for securities fraud could be upheld.
21
 The Court 
found that no such indication existed in the California Corporate 
Securities Act and granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants.
22
 
This Comment explores the potential effects of the Ninth Circuit 
finding that California municipalities are immune from state causes 
of action for securities fraud. Part II describes the factual background 
of Nuveen Municipal High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of 
Alameda.
23
 Part III sets forth the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. Part IV 
examines the value of a state cause of action for securities fraud, the 
financial repercussions of the court’s decision, and the steps that the 
California legislature and California Supreme Court can take to 
counteract the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Part V concludes that 
California’s economy only stands to suffer from the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding, and that the California legislature or California Supreme 
Court should rectify the Ninth Circuit’s holding. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the late 1990s, the City of Alameda (“Alameda”) decided to 
include telecommunications––cable TV and Internet––as part of its 
municipal electrical system.
24
 APT sought to borrow a significant 
portion of the capital needed to fund this project, so it issued revenue 
bond anticipation notes in the amount of $33 million.
25
 
Relying on the official statement prepared by a municipal bond 
underwriter, Stone & Youngberg, and a feasibility report on the 
 
 19. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25013 (West 2014); id. § 25400; id. § 818.2.  
 20. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1115. 
 21. Id. at 1126–27. 
 22. Id. at 1127. 
 23. Id. at 1116–18. 
 24. Id. at 1116. 
 25. Id. 
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proposed refinancing prepared by Uptown Services, Nuveen 
purchased $17.75 million in face value of the notes.
26
 Nuveen later 
purchased an additional $2.8 million for a total face value of $20.55 
million.
27
 
The official statement disclosed certain risk factors affecting the 
viability of the system.
28
 Among those factors disclosed was the risk 
of competition from other service providers, including Comcast.
29
 
While the official statement suggested that the telecommunications 
system could be a strong competitor in the field, it specifically stated 
that no assurances could be made in the notes or in any future 
financing that APT may need to repay the notes.
30
 
The feasibility report, included as part of the official statement, 
relied on information provided by APT, which included a five-year 
financial forecast and subscriber and financial growth projections.
31
 
To compensate for the risks assumed, the notes offered an 
interest rate of 7 percent, with a yield to maturity at 7.25 percent, 
nearly double that of a typical tax-free municipal bond in 2004.
32
 
Three sources secured repayment of the notes on June 1, 2009, 
including: (1) net revenue from the telecom system; (2) a potential 
refinancing of the system prior to maturity; and (3) proceeds from 
the sale of the system.
33
 
Due to fierce competition with Comcast and the sharp economic 
downturn in 2007 and 2008, APT could not repay the notes from the 
system’s revenue, and refinancing was no longer an option.
34
 In 
November 2008, Alameda decided to sell the system to Comcast for 
$15 million.
35
 Although Nuveen received more than $6 million in 
interest payments on the notes, it sustained losses of more than $10 
million on the notes.
36
 
Attempting to rectify its losses, Nuveen sued the City of 
Alameda “for alleged violations of Section 10b-5 and Section 20(a) 
 
 26. Id. at 1115, 1117. 
 27. Id. at 1117. 
 28. Id. at 1116. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1116–17. 
 32. Id. at 1116. 
 33. Id. at 1117. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and California Corporate 
Securities Act [sections] 24000, 25500, and 25504.1.”
37
 “Nuveen 
argue[s] that the official statement contained inflated and unrealistic 
projections that materially overstated the telecom system’s 
anticipated performance.”
38
 Nuveen alleged that Alameda’s 
misrepresentations fraudulently induced Nuveen to purchase the 
notes.
39
 
Nuveen introduced expert testimony that the projections of the 
official statement relied on outdated information.
40
 Nuveen’s expert 
further testified that the outdated information “artificially increased 
the expected [average revenue per unit] and number of subscribers in 
the subsequent five years.”
41
 Nuveen’s expert also explained “that 
ten days before the issuance of the official statement, the Alameda 
Public Utilities Board adopted a five-year business plan for Alameda 
Power that used significantly less optimistic projections for Alameda 
Power Cable’s future financial performance than the projections in 
the Official Statement.”
42
 
Alameda eventually moved for summary judgment on both the 
federal and state claims.
43
 The district court granted Alameda’s 
motion and held that Nuveen could not establish a triable issue as to 
loss causation on the federal claims, and that Alameda was immune 
from suit under California law on the state law claims.
44
 Nuveen 
appealed summary judgment.
45
 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision in its 
entirety.
46
 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit rejected Nuveen’s 
contention that loss causation could be shown by demonstrating that 
they would not have purchased the notes “but for” Alameda’s 
fraudulent misrepresentations.
47
 The court followed the United States 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1118. 
 43. Id. at 1117. 
 44. Id. at 1118–20. 
 45. Id. at 1118. 
 46. Id. at 1128. 
 47. Id. at 1121. 
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo
48
 that loss causation and transactional causation are two 
separate requirements.
49
 Transactional causation is satisfied by 
showing that the injury would not have occurred but for the 
defendant’s misrepresentations.
50
 Loss causation, on the other hand, 
requires that there be a causal link between the plaintiff’s injuries 
and the misrepresentation.
51
 The misrepresentation must be the 
cause-in-fact of the injuries alleged by the plaintiff.
52
 The court 
concluded that Nuveen had in fact failed to establish a triable issue of 
fact as to loss causation.
53
 
The court then turned to Nuveen’s state law claims for violations 
of the California Corporate Securities Act.
54
 The court recognized 
that the Corporate Securities Act imposes liability on “‘any person’ 
who willfully makes a false or misleading material statement for the 
purpose of inducing the sale of a security.”
55
 “The [Act] defines 
‘person’ to include ‘a government, or a political subdivision of a 
government.’”
56
 However, the California Tort Claims Act of 1963, 
currently known as the Government Claims Act, provides immunity 
to public entities “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.”
57
 
Section 818.8 specifically provides immunity where an injury is 
caused by a negligent or intentional misrepresentation of an 
employee of a public entity.
58
 
Despite Nuveen’s arguments to the contrary, the court 
concluded that Alameda was in fact immune from suit for violations 
of the Corporate Securities Act.
59
 In doing so, the court drew upon 
the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Caldwell v. Montoya.
60
 
In Caldwell, the court considered whether public employees 
were liable for discretionary acts that allegedly violated the state’s 
 
 48. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 49. Id. at 1116. 
 50. Id. at 1118. 
 51. Id. at 1119. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1123. 
 54. Id. at 1124. 
 55. Id. (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25400, 25500 (West 1969)). 
 56. Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 25013 (West 1994)). 
 57. Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815 (West 1963)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1127. 
 60. 897 P.2d 1320 (Cal. 1995); Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1125. 
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Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).
61
 The court ultimately 
concluded that the general duty imposed on public employees under 
the FEHA did not override immunity for discretionary acts provided 
by section 820.2 of the California Government Code.
62
 The 
California Supreme Court opined, “The intent of the [Government 
Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against 
government entities [or employees], but to confine potential 
governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity 
is waived only if the various requirements of the [A]ct are 
satisfied.”
63
 
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court held that statutory 
immunity could only be withheld where there exists a clear 
indication of legislative intent that such immunity be withheld or 
withdrawn.
64
 In other words, the statute must clearly withdraw 
statutory immunity.
65
 
The Ninth Circuit went on to reject Nuveen’s contention that 
DeJung v. Superior Court
66
 governed this dispute, reasoning that the 
employer had no basis for invoking immunity.
67
 The Court 
ultimately concluded that because the California Corporate Securities 
Act did not override the Government Claims Act, Alameda properly 
invoked immunity against Nuveen’s claims.
68
 The district court 
properly granted summary judgment on the Nuveen’s state-law 
claims.
69
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding may trouble California municipal 
bond investors. After Nuveen, municipalities can, in essence, defraud 
investors. California law leaves those investors without a state-law 
remedy. 
However, investors may not be the only ones affected by the 
court’s ruling. Investors’ reactions to the Ninth Circuit’s holding may 
 
 61. Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1322. 
 62. Id. at 1323. 
 63. Id. at 1328 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. Id. at 1331. 
 65. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1125. 
 66. 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 99 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 67. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1127. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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create problems for municipalities seeking to borrow funds for public 
infrastructure projects—that is, schools, highways, or public 
facilities.
70
 With California as the largest municipal borrower in the 
United States,
71
 the federal and other state governments may 
experience financial shocks flowing from the Court’s decision. 
Despite these disconcerting effects, the California legislature or 
the California Supreme Court can restore the state-law remedy 
eradicated by the Ninth Circuit’s holding. This part explores the 
effects likely to flow from the court’s decision and why California 
should take prompt action to return to investors a state-law remedy 
for municipalities’ misrepresentations. 
A.  State v. Federal Securities Laws:  
Does the Court’s Ruling Make a Difference? 
To establish a claim for securities fraud under federal law, a 
plaintiff must establish: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; 
(2) scienter; (3) connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 
(4) reliance, often referred to as transaction causation; (5) economic 
loss; and (6) loss causation.
72
 
Similarly, section 25400 of the California Corporations Code 
states: 
It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in this 
state . . . to make, for the purpose of inducing the purchase 
or sale of such security by others, any statement which 
was . . . false or misleading with respect to any material 
fact, or which omitted to state any material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading, and 
which he knew or had reasonable ground to believe was so 
false or misleading.
73
 
Under California law, plaintiffs have a lesser burden to satisfy in 
establishing a cause of action for misrepresentations.
74
 Section 25400 
does not require (1) proof of reliance, or (2) proof of causation, 
although the facts must be material.
75
 
 
 70. Randle B. Pollard, Who’s Going to Pick Up the Trash?—Using the Build America Bond 
Program to Help State and Local Governments’ Cash Deficit, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 171, 180 (2011). 
 71. Arezki et al., supra note 10, at 35–36.  
 72. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 73. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400 (West 2014).  
 74. WITKIN, supra note 6, § 444. 
 75. Id. 
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In Nuveen, this lesser burden would likely have led to a different 
outcome with regard to Nuveen’s state cause of action. The Ninth 
Circuit granted Alameda’s motion for summary judgment because 
Nuveen had failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to loss 
causation.
76
 Because causation does not need to be proven under the 
California Corporate Securities Act, Nuveen would have been able to 
survive summary judgment.
77
 As a general matter, the California 
Corporate Securities Act provides relief where the federal securities 
laws do not. 
B.  Financial Repercussions 
As of 2012, California has the tenth largest economy in the 
world with a Gross State Product of more than $2 trillion.
78
 Of that 
total amount, California collected through taxes during the 2012–13 
tax year around $100 billion.
79
 However, California currently carries 
more than $800 billion in financial obligations.
80
 Even though 
California’s financial state has recently improved somewhat, it still 
maintains the third-lowest credit rating after Illinois and New 
Jersey.
81
 
Eradicating municipal liability for misrepresentations in the 
securities arena may only exacerbate California’s already heavy debt 
problems. As the largest borrower among all fifty states, California 
relies heavily on bonds to meet its financial obligations.
82
 As a 
general matter, investors will not assume risks without some promise 
of a higher return. As the old adage goes: high risk, high return. 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Nuveen arguably creates higher 
risk for bond-purchasing investors. They must run the risk that 
municipalities will either intentionally or negligently misrepresent an 
 
 76. Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 730 F.3d 1111, 1123 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
 77. WITKIN, supra note 6, § 444.  
 78. Adam Belz, Map: GDP of US States Compared to Other Countries, STAR TRIB. 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.startribune.com/blogs/244326311.html. 
 79. Sources of State Taxes, CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, http://www.sco.ca.gov 
/state_finances_101_state_taxes.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). 
 80. William Fletcher & Ed Ring, Calculating California’s Total State and Local 
Government Debt, CAL. POLICY CTR. (April 26, 2013), http://californiapublicpolicycenter.org 
/calculating-californias-total-state-and-local-government-debt/. 
 81. James Nash & Brian Chappatta, California Upgraded by Moody’s to Highest in 13 
Years, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-25/moody-s 
-upgrades-california-to-aa3-on-financial-gains.html. 
 82. Id. at 36. 
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investment to the investor’s detriment. Thus, it follows that to 
convince these investors to lend money, California municipalities 
will have to offer higher interest rates. If the risk is too great, 
investors may take “flight to quality” bonds from other 
municipalities.
83
 With California being the largest municipal 
borrower, this can have “spillover effects,” not only on neighboring 
states but also on the federal government as a whole.
84
 
1.  Flight to Quality and Spillover Effects 
A recent study explored “whether a shock to the market for 
bonds of one U.S. state can affect the markets for bonds from other 
states (a situation known as ‘spillover’).”
85
 The study also 
investigated the effects that state bond markets might have on the 
market for U.S. Treasury securities.
86
 As a general matter, when a 
state bond market suffered as borrowing costs increased, investors 
fled to higher quality, less risky bonds in neighboring states.
87
 
Of the few states that could potentially affect federal securities, 
California falls within that small group.
88
 Yields on California bonds 
and those on federal securities move “significantly in opposite 
directions following a shock to both bond markets.”
89
 Thus, a shock 
to the California bond market may lead to increased instability in the 
Treasury bond market.
90
 
2.  Increased Interest Rates 
The bonds purchased by Nuveen yielded interest rates more than 
double those of a typical bond.
91
 During the life of those bonds, 
Nuveen was able to recover more than $6 million.
92
 Despite this 
generous rate to reflect the risky nature of the bonds, Nuveen still 
lost millions of dollars.
93
 The Ninth Circuit’s holding makes these 
 
 83. Id. at 35. 
 84. Id. at 36. 
 85. Id. at 35. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 36. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 730 F.3d 1111, 1116 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
 92. Id. at 1117. 
 93. Id. 
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bonds even riskier. Investors have no way of knowing whether the 
information they are using in buying municipal bonds is reliable. To 
compensate for this new risk, investors will need to demand a higher 
rate of interest.
94
 This in turn increases the borrowing costs of 
municipalities, triggering the spillover effects and the flight to 
quality discussed in the previous section.
95
 Simply, California cannot 
afford such a result. 
C.  Resolving the Issue 
To resolve the issue created by Nuveen, a solution will need to 
come from either the California legislature or the California Supreme 
Court. The Ninth Circuit explained in its decision what the California 
Securities Act lacked: clear intent to withdraw immunity.
96
 
1.  Legislative Relief 
At this point, it is not enough for a statute to merely state that a 
municipality may be liable.
97
 The California Corporation Act did that 
already.
98
 The California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Caldwell is 
instructive as to why clear withdrawal of immunity is necessary. In 
interpreting the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute,” 
the Caldwell court reasoned, “The intent of the [Act] is not to expand 
the rights of plaintiffs in suits against government entities [or 
employees], but to confine potential government liability to rigidly 
delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various 
requirements of the [Act] are satisfied.”
99
 The California Supreme 
Court went on to explain that: 
When addressing the Act’s application, we have 
consistently regarded actionable duty and statutory 
immunity as separate issues, holding that in general, an 
immunity provision need not even be considered until it is 
determined that a cause of action would otherwise lie 
against the public employee or entity. This analytical 
treatment arises from our recognition that the question of 
 
 94. Pollard, supra note 70, at 193. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1126. 
 97. Id. 
 98. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400 (West 2014); id. § 25013. 
 99. Caldwell v. Montoya, 897 P.2d 1320, 1328 (Cal. 1995) (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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[actionable] duty is only a threshold issue, beyond which 
remain the immunity barriers.
100
 
The Ninth Circuit understood this to mean that a statute cannot 
merely impose liability, for that would only satisfy the question 
of actionable duty.
101
 Rather, a statute must also expressly 
withdraw immunity to clear the “immunity barriers.”
102
 
Therefore, to properly amend the California Securities Act, the 
California legislature must understand that clearly stating 
liability is insufficient; rather, an amendment to the act must 
expressly withhold immunity.
103
 
2.  Legislative or Judicial Relief 
Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme 
Court identified another avenue by which the California legislature 
might clearly indicate an intent to remove statutory immunity: where 
the statute’s purpose is clearly intended to address an issue specific 
to the government.
104
 The Caldwell court turned to whistle-blower 
statutes as a quintessential example of such statutes.
105
 
In a lengthy footnote, the California Supreme Court noted a 
court of appeal decision, Southern California Rapid Transit District 
v. Superior Court.
106
 There, the court of appeal determined that a suit 
for wrongful discharge under a whistle-blower statute could not be 
defended on grounds of governmental immunity.
107
 In light of this 
case, the Caldwell court concluded: 
Insofar as such whistleblower statutes focus in particular on 
those who act to suppress or punish revelations of fraud, 
corruption, or illegality in government business, the core 
statutory objectives might well be obviated by a conclusion 
that cover-up efforts by a public official are eligible for 
immunity. By their specific nature and purpose, such laws 
may indeed provide a clear indication of intent that the 
 
 100. Id. at 1328–29 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 101. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1126. 
 102. Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1329. 
 103. Nuveen, 730 F.3d at 1126. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1329–30 n.7. 
 106. Id.; 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 107. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665, 676 (1994). 
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personal immunities of public employees are abrogated.
108
 
Under this rationale, the Ninth Circuit might have withheld 
immunity from Alameda on policy grounds where the core statutory 
objective might be obviated by making municipalities eligible for 
immunity. The purpose in enacting the California Securities Act was 
“to protect the public against the imposition of unsubstantial, 
unlawful and fraudulent stock and investment schemes and the 
securities based thereon.”
109
 Thus, the California legislature can 
either clarify the purpose of the California Securities Act, or the 
California Supreme Court can review this issue and conclude on 
policy grounds that municipalities frustrate “core statutory 
objectives” when they claim immunity from securities fraud liability. 
In sum, the potential effects of the Ninth Circuit’s holding may 
be avoided by the California legislature amending the securities laws 
to reflect a clear indication of withdrawing statutory immunity. 
Moreover, either the California Supreme Court can hold on policy 
grounds that the Ninth Circuit’s holding would frustrate the core 
statutory objectives of the California Securities Laws, or the 
California legislature can provide a clear indication through the 
statutory purpose. Without the intervention of these two branches of 
government, investors will be at a loss for a state cause of action and 
will be forced to turn to the federal securities laws for redress. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As California faces troubling times ahead, increased borrowing 
costs will only exacerbate the state’s growing financial problems. 
The California state cause of action against misrepresentation plays a 
unique role independent from the federal securities law against 
securities fraud. Unless the California legislature or California 
Supreme Court clarify the intent of the Corporate Securities Act, the 
potential effects may harm not only the fragile economic 
circumstances in California, but may spillover and affect the United 
States as a whole. For the policy reasons discussed in this Comment, 
immunity from liability in the securities context will only harm 
California municipalities and the people they represent. 
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